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ABSTRACT
It seems a common belief that a person cannot have genuine compassion for other
people until he can have compassion for himself.

However, it seems a pervasive

phenomenon that when encountering difficult situations (e.g. failure and fatal disease), many
people do not give themselves the compassion they would give to other people in the same
situations.

This theoretical study aims at supporting my hypothesis that people without

self-compassion can still have compassion for others.

Relevant evolutionary and

neurobiological theories and object relations theories are used to explore this phenomenon.
I also apply these two theories to a case study of a client at my interning organization, which
seems to provide further validation of my hypothesis.

A critique of this study and

suggestions for future research are included in the discussion chapter.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
1

The phenomenon addressed in my research is that many people, when encountering

difficult situations (such as failure and fatal disease), do not give themselves the compassion
they would give, in the same situations, to other people, especially those they care about.
other words, these people do not have self-compassion.

In

It seems to me that many people,

including serious thinkers, have a misconception regarding my phenomenon -- they believe
erroneously that it does not exist, and that compassion for others could not possibly come
from anyone who lacks self-compassion.

My research aims at proving my thesis argument,

which is that people without self-compassion can still have compassion for others.
Research has shown that having self-compassion brings with it many significant
benefits (Breines & Chen, 2012; Neff, 2007; Neff, 2009; Werner et al., 2012), and that
self-compassion is a skill that can be learned (Germer & Neff, 2013). Fortunately there
already exist effective programs to teach it (Germer, 2009; Gilbert & Procter, 2006; Neff &
Germer, 2013). Research has also shown, however, that many people remain very critical of
themselves all their lives (Gilbert & Procter, 2006; Pauley & McPherson, 2010). Now that
there already exist many effective programs to teach self-compassion, the question arises:
why is it difficult for many self-critical people to even try to learn self-compassion, not
mention to have self-compassion consistently? I have been unable to find any published
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   For convenience, I use the masculine pronouns in the course of my thesis to cover people
in general, without meaning any disrespect to women.	
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study that directly addresses this question.

My research may solve this puzzle so that people

can get some relief from self-blame and may benefit from self-compassion.
The focal phenomenon strikes me as being devastating to compassionate people who
lack self-compassion, and also heartbreaking to their loved ones, that they would have
kindness and compassion except for themselves.

My research might help social workers

better understand this prevalent phenomenon and assist them in developing treatments for
people with this problem or related problems such as anxiety, low self-esteem and depression,
helping such troubled people to recognize its benefits and to practice self-compassion until it
becomes natural. People who would be interested in my research include those concerned
with their own emotional well-being, from those who suffer anxiety, depression and low
self-esteem, to those who wish to improve their quality of life in general and those who help
other people heal and grow from mental health professionals to community leaders, from
parents to teachers. I hope that my research would draw the education system’s attention,
and would help it develop more effective ways to help children. My research might also
help anyone who cares for children to communicate with them in ways that can optimize their
development and emotional well-being. In a word, my research may help reduce the
profound misery suffered by individuals and families afflicted with the inability to feel
self-compassion and bring them some peace and harmony.
The two theories I use to examine the focal phenomenon are relevant evolutionary
and neurobiological theories, and object relations theories.
The evolutionary and neurobiological theories can illuminate why people have
evolved to have compassion and self-blame, two types of adaptive instinct.
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Neurobiological

findings can shed light on why feeling compassion for others can make a person feel “good”
physiologically.

These theories can support my thesis statement that it is possible for one to

feel compassion for others, even without self-compassion.
I believe that one of the main reasons for my phenomenon is the severe and often
crippling effects experienced by adults who have suffered from abuse as children by primary
caregivers. Object relations theories are also closely related to my belief.

According to

Berzoff et al. (2011), “Object relations theory pays particular attention to the earliest
experiences and defenses (p.155).”

Goldstein (2011) maintained that,

Object relations theories describe the process by which the infant takes in
(internalizes) the outside world, thereby acquiring basic perceptions of and attitudes
toward the self and others that become structuralized within the person.
Goldstein (2011) also claimed that,
Fairbairn argued that it was the inability of external objects to provide for the infant’s
needs, and the frustrations that the child experiences in significantly early
relationships, that thwart development.
Now that I want to study how childhood abuse by primary caregivers can contribute
to my phenomenon, object relations theories thus seem closely related.

These two theories

can help us explore the focal phenomenon and my thesis argument, and allow me to provide a
biopsychosocial analysis of the focal phenomenon.
This theoretical thesis contains five chapters. The first chapter is the introduction.
The second includes conceptualization and methodology, where I discuss major concepts
from each theory and my methods of analyzing the focal phenomenon. The third introduces
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the phenomenon in detail. In the fourth chapter, I present relevant evolutionary and
neurobiological theories and findings. I introduce object relations theories in the fifth
chapter. The last chapter offers a discussion, which applies each of the two theories to my
phenomenon and a case study, and critique on my research. The last chapter also includes
my speculations of the focal phenomenon, along with suggestions for future study.
I now turn to chapter two to address conceptualization and methodology of this thesis,
which includes its major concepts, methods of analyzing the focal phenomenon and identify
methodological weaknesses.
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CHAPTER II
Conceptualization and Methodology
In this chapter, I am going to discuss the major concepts of the two theories that I use
and how I plan to use them to examine the focal phenomenon, as well as some strengths and
limitations of my methodology.
In this research, primary caregivers refer to people who, on a daily basis, consistently
take on most of the childcare responsibilities from a child’s early years on.

They can be a

child’s parents, grandparents, older siblings, or other guardians. I focus on all forms of abuse
against the child, from birth up until age twelve. I take it as self-evident that all forms of
childhood abuse have negative effects on a person’s psyche, including, among other effects,
low self-esteem, shame, self-blame, and the resultant inability to feel self-compassion.

In

this paper, I use primary caregivers and parents interchangeably.
Compassion refers to such an emotion one feels when witnessing other people’s
suffering that the witness feels moved by others’ suffering, understands their suffering,
deeply feels for them and subsequently feels an instinctual motivation to alleviate their
suffering (Haidt, 2003; Lazarus, 1991).

Besides, Neff (2008) defined self-compassion as

having three components: 1) being kind and understanding to oneself instead of being
self-critical or self-judgmental, when facing difficulties, failures or inadequacies; 2)
recognizing that everyone is imperfect, instead of thinking that “I” were the only person who
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suffers; and 3) holding one’s painful thoughts and feelings in a way that they are neither
suppressed nor exaggerated.
Self-compassion can provide various benefits.

Studies have shown that

self-compassion can provide positive psychological strengths, like the ability to feel happy, to
have emotional intelligence, optimism, curiosity and social connectedness, as well as
decreased anxiety, self-criticism, depression and fear of failure (Neff, 2007; Neff, 2009;
Werner et al, 2012). Self-compassionate people tend to admit and deal with mistakes,
modify ineffective behavior and take on challenges. They do not characteristically berate
themselves when failing (Neff, 2009). Self-compassion can motivate people to learn and
grow (Breines & Chen, 2012), and helps people maintain their self-worth.
Research has provided methods of teaching people how to cultivate and practice
self-compassion. Germer (2009) offered a wealth of easy exercises to help develop such
skills. Gilbert and Procter (2006) created a systematic training program to teach self-critical
people how to have self-compassion. Neff and Germer (2013) developed Mindful
Self-Compassion (MSC), a program that teaches self-compassion skills to the general
population.
Research has also shown, however, that many self-critical people remain so all their
lives (Gilbert & Procter, 2006; Pauley & McPherson, 2010).

Why is it difficult for these

people to learn self-compassion? Why is my phenomenon prevalent? Studies on these
questions are for the most part lacking, which inspired me to conduct my research.
The two theories that I use to examine the phenomenon are relevant evolutionary and
neurobiological theories and the object relations theories. In the evolutionary and
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neurological theories, the main components that I use are the humans’ instinctual need for
social connection, the evolutionary value of compassion and self-criticism, the physiology of
compassion and relevant emotions.

As for the object relations theories, the major

components that I use to explore the focal phenomenon are a few defense mechanisms,
Klein’s two developmental positions, and concepts of True and False self.

Of course, the

sub-components are multiple, and will be looked at in the course of this paper. In this paper,
I use the following concepts interchangeably: object-representations and images of the object;
self-representation and self-image; parents and primary caregivers.
There are a few strengths of my research. In addition to providing theoretical
analyses, I use my own personal interactions with my clients to examine my findings.

In

this way, I can be sure that the information I obtain does not get manipulated, or distorted, for
the purposes of approving somebody else's theory. The limitations of my research are that
with such a small number of samples, I cannot possibly provide scientific evaluations to
determine the validity of my findings; my case studies are probably not representative for the
focal phenomenon. What’s more, I see some biases and limitations in myself. I am young
and inexperienced, and not always sure that what I have perceived is what was said or
meant. A further difficulty for me is that my English, while improving, is not always
sufficient to understand all I should about the two theories.
Using the theories and methods mentioned above, I intend to take a close look at the
complications, varieties and variations inherent in the focal phenomenon. These
considerations, and some others, will comprise the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III
Phenomenology
In this chapter, I introduce the focal phenomenon.

The phenomenon is that many

people when encountering difficult situations do not give themselves the compassion they
would give, in the same situations, to people they care about.

In other words, these people

who are easily and naturally capable of feeling compassion for other people, including family
members, friends and even strangers, are incapable of feeling compassion for themselves.

I

have looked into relevant studies, and have considered my own experience of various case
studies that I have encountered.

My research excludes those people who pretend to be

compassionate towards others, and those socially sophisticated people who pretend to
undermine themselves and forgive when in reality they do not.

Only those who sincerely

feel compassion for others and not for themselves are the focus of my study.
Many people seem to have a misconception of my phenomenon.

They believe

mistakenly that a person cannot have genuine compassion for other people until he could
have self-compassion.

Rubin and Rubin (1975) presented their theory that a person’s hatred

of himself would negate the possibility of his feeling compassion for other people.

Here are

two more examples:
If one is cruel to himself, how can we expect him to be compassionate with others?
– Hasdai, Ben ha-Melekh, ve-Ha-Nazer
Be gentle first with yourself if you wish to be gentle with others.

-- Lama Yeshe

However, from my experience, personal and professional, I am convinced that my
	
  

8	
  

phenomenon is ubiquitous.

I have seen this phenomenon all my life in myself, my family,

friends and acquaintances.

I see that my parents manifest it, as does my best friend in

Beijing, as well as many Smith classmates whom I have questioned about it.

During my

internship at a Partial Hospitalization Program (PHP), I saw it every day, everywhere, among
the clients and the staff.
Amazingly, this phenomenon, so common and fundamental, has not caught much
attention from researchers, so far as I know.

Here and there, it is recognized when

researchers study other topics, but it has rarely been studied as a topic worthy of central
consideration.

Studies on troubled people who have low self-esteem, negative self-image,

self-criticism, feelings of shame and worthlessness, and self-hate, all of which impede one’s
self-compassion, are described often in books and articles (Rubin & Rubin, 1975; Gilbert &
Andrews, 1998; Baisden et al., 1982; Brown, 2006; Pinto‐Gouveia et al., 2013; Campos et al.,
2013; Gilbert et al., 2012; Clark & Coker, 2009).
often feel compassion for others.

What I fail to find is why such people

It has been frustrating for me searching for a forest of

relevant information about this phenomenon and finding only a few shrubs.
which grant the reality that I have found, are very reassuring to me.

These studies,

Germer and Neff (2013)

described the intense self-criticism that many people feel when they are in difficult situations.
Such people tend to denounce themselves, but would be unlikely to criticize a stranger
(Germer & Neff, 2013; Neff and Vonk, 2009; Neff, 2003b). It is not unusual to encounter
very kind and compassionate people who often beat themselves up and that most people
reported they were kinder to others than to themselves (Neff, 2003a).

Tami Simon, the

founder of Sounds True (a publisher), said in her Self-Acceptance Project that it was often
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much easier for many people to feel compassion and forgiveness toward others than toward
themselves.

In one interview from this Project, Kristin Neff mentioned that many people

were loving, supportive and encouraging with their children, but were very critical of
themselves.

In another interview from this Project, Brene Brown advised people to direct

their compassionate feelings toward other people to themselves as a way to cultivate
self-compassion, suggesting that generally it was much easier to have compassion for others
than to have self-compassion.
At this point, I want to introduce the case of Joanne, who was one of my clients at
PHP.

She was a white American woman in her late 50s, divorced with two children, a son

and a daughter, both in their late 20s.
six years.

She had been working as a clerk in a grocery store for

She was diagnosed with Major Depression and Generalized Anxiety Disorder.

In her childhood, her alcoholic father had been emotionally and physically abusive to her,
and to her mother and siblings, but at times in group sessions, Joanne blamed herself for her
father’s abuse: “My father had to work extremely hard to support the whole family…I always
knew it’s my fault that dad got angry.

If I had been a better kid, dad wouldn’t have gotten

so angry…Sometimes, I made dad so angry that my mom and sisters had to be beaten as
well…”
She described her mother as “a good-hearted woman…a sad, obedient housewife.”
Joanne appeared to be a caring, amiable person, and a loving, responsible and selfless mother.
She was well liked by staff and other clients at PHP, and she seemed to be very fond of the
people she worked with, including her employer.
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The only person against whom she was cold was herself, as far as I know.
Joanne forgot her eyeglasses.

One day,

She shouted, “I’m so stupid! Totally useless!” At another

time, she confided in one group therapy session that her parents, especially her father, made
her feel “it's either perfect or nothing . . . I guess maybe that’s why I have unrealistically high
expectations for myself . . . I wouldn’t hurt a butterfly, but I'm very hard on
myself.” Besides, she seemed to have double standards -- she felt she had to take care of
other people, but she did not expect them to “burden” themselves to do things for her.

Once

she revealed in a group session that she did not want to take care of others all the time and
felt guilty for feeling this way.
Joanne: Sometimes, it’s exhausting and overwhelming to take care of other people . . .
But I have to.

What can you do when someone comes to you for help? Say “no”?

No, I can’t do that.

I just can’t say no!

Me: What about your own needs? How can you help other people when you need
time and energy to take care of yourself?
Joanne: My needs? That’s a good question . . . You mean, take care of my own
needs first? No, no, no.

That would be very selfish!

Honestly, hmmm hmmm

(nervous laughter), I feel guilty about feeling not want to help other people.

I’m

terrible!
Me: What about times when you go to someone for help but he can’t help you right
away? What would you think of that person?
Joanne: Oh, of course, I understand.

People are busy and they have a lot to do.

shouldn’t burden them.
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I

Me: So would you think they are selfish?
Joanne: Of course not!

They are just busy.

They just can’t.

What am I supposed

to do? To make them kill themselves to help me? No, no, they aren’t selfish.
understand.

I

I shouldn’t burden other people.

Me: But why would you push yourself to help others when you can’t?
Joanne: Oh, that’ different!

I should always help other people.

Following are some portions of her dialogue with me and another client.
Me: You are such a nice person, but not to yourself.
Joanne: I’m always a caregiver.

Taking care of other people makes me feel good

about myself.
Me: I wonder why you don’t have compassion for yourself?
Joanne: I don't deserve it . . .
...
Joanne: Thank God! My children aren’t like me. I’m such a loser!
Another client: I don't think you are a loser.
Joanne: That's because you don't know me well enough.
...
Joanne: Having compassion from other people would show that I’m weak.

I don’t

want to look vulnerable.
Me: So when you are compassionate for other people, are you trying to make them
look weak?
Joanne: Of course not!
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Me: So why would other people’s compassion for you make you feel weak about
yourself?
Joanne: Well . . . that’s different . . . I don’t know . . . My father always told us to be
strong . . .“Don’t let other people think you are a whining baby!”
words.

Those are his

I can still remember them vividly . . .

Over and over again in group sessions, I heard most clients insulting themselves while
other times they would cry out to other clients things like, “No, no, no, you are not fair to
yourself!” and such things as, “It hurts me to hear you put yourself down so bad.

You’re

really a good person, really good.”
In the following chapter, I will look at how evolutionary and neurobiological theories
might illuminate the focal phenomenon and the case of Joanne.
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CHAPTER IV
Evolutionary and Neurobiological Theories
In this chapter, I use evolutionary and neurobiological perspectives to support my
hypothesis that it is possible for people without self-compassion to still have compassion for
other people.
The Evolutionary Perspective
In this section, I will use evolutionary theories to discuss how compassion for others
and self-criticism, two crucial emotional instincts, can help humans to meet our instinctual
desire of belonging and connecting with others.
Introduction of evolution and natural selection: Conventional evolutionary biology
theory maintains that living creatures adapt to their environment, and that species develop,
over time, desirable characteristics or traits that best help them survive and reproduce in their
environment through the process of natural selection (Darwin, 1959).

Natural selection has

significantly influenced the study of human behavior (including, presumably, human
emotion), primarily in evolutionary psychology, which emphasizes that human behavior
emerges as a by-product of adaptive or survival mechanisms in the brain and mind (Oakley et
al., 2012).

The need to belong and connect with other people is a fundamental human

motivation (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).

I argue that human emotions have been evolved

into human instincts that can best help us survive and thrive.
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Humans are social creatures.

This fact can be understood from the evolutionary

perspective -- belonging to groups and connecting with others can best help humans survive
and thrive; therefore, over time, humans have evolved to have the instinctual desire to belong
and connect.

Now, I am going to summarize the vital benefits people can get from group

life and social connections.
Vital benefits of group life and social connections: Group life is vital in meeting
humans’ needs, both survival and emotional.

In the early stage of human evolution, humans

needed to live in groups in order to conduct survival tasks, such as maintaining defenses,
fighting against enemies and disasters, hunting large or dangerous animals and building
shelters and tools (Rofe, 1984).

People in a group could help each other, for example, by

sharing resources, knowledge and skills, and by taking care of each other’s family members.
Besides, it is more likely for people to find mates when they are connected with other people.
Moreover, adults who formed and maintained long-term relationships would be more
likely to raise offspring till they (offspring) reach maturity and reproduce (Shaver et al.,
1988).

As for emotional needs, connecting with groups can provide survival benefits,

thereby providing people with psychological security and comfort.

It is the same situation

in the modern world, where people need social connections to get things done and feel
emotionally well.
Besides, the process of natural selection must have kept those infants who were born
with the instinct to attach to their (mostly) adult caregivers.

Only those infants and children

who desired and managed to stay with their adult caregivers got to survive, whereas the rest
died out, who had no capacity of bonding with their caregivers, or resisted staying with them
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(their caregivers) and thus left them.

Therefore, from the evolutionary point of view, human

infants and children have inherited their ancestors’ instinctual desire to bond with their
caregivers.

In other words, it is infants’ and children’s instinct to trust their adult caregivers

100% and stay with them (their caregivers) by all means, including blaming themselves when
caregivers fail to meet their (children’s) needs.

This would shed light on how childhood

abuse impedes a person’s development of self-compassion, which will be discussed in later
chapters.
It seems valid that human’s instinct to form and maintain interpersonal connections
would provide both survival and reproductive benefits (Ainsworth, 1989; Axelrod &
Hamilton, 1981; Barash, 1977; Bowlby, 1969; Buss, 1990, 1991; Hogan et al., 1985;
Moreland, 1987).

In this line of thought, today’s human beings are the offspring of those

who had the instinct and abilities to cooperate with other people, and to form and maintain
social bonds, so they could survive and reproduce.

Today’s humans have inherited from

their ancestors’ adaptive traits, including the instinct to connect with others and to belong to
groups.

In a word, humans evolved to have the instinctual desire to belong and connect

with others.
Emotions’ evolutionary value: Emotions can be understood as desirable, adaptive
characteristics that help humans to meet their instincts of belonging.

It is likely that various

human internal mechanisms have resulted from evolution’s natural selection; these
mechanisms help individuals belong to social groups and maintain long-term relationships.
Goetz et al. (2010) presumed that these mechanisms would include the affective mechanism
that could make humans have an instinctual tendency to feel distress when lacking of social
	
  

16	
  

connections; they further claimed that certain mechanism could make people tend to resist the
dissolution of social connections.

Goetz et al. (2010) also suggested that we humans have

evolved to have the affective mechanism that could make us happy when connected with
other people.
Like any other adaptive traits, emotions emerged and evolved to serve functions that
can help humans survive and thrive, to connect with others and to belong to groups (Ekman,
1992; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009).
emotions.

There are various types of

For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on only two types: pro-social emotions

and self-critical emotions.

Generally speaking, pro-social emotions can help people to be

accepted by social groups, whereas self-critical emotions can stop people from being rejected
by their communities.
The evolutionary value of pro-social emotions: From the group’s perspective,
pro-social emotions would guide and motivate people to facilitate interactions within the
larger social context, maximize individuals’ pro-social behavior and maintain the social order
(Haidt, 2003).

From the individual’s perspective, pro-social emotions can help humans to

be accepted by their social communities, and can make people feel good about themselves.
Healthy people, both women and men, tend to get a sense of pleasure, self-worth and
competence from being kind, helpful and generous toward others (Oakley et al., 2012).

The

ability to empathize with others contributes to humans’ sense of belonging (Baumeister &
Leary, 1995).
Compassion: Compassion is one of the pro-social emotions.

As I mentioned earlier,

compassion refers to such an emotion one feels when witnessing other people’s suffering that
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the witness feels moved by others’ suffering, understands their suffering, deeply feels for
them and subsequently feels an instinctual motivation to alleviate their suffering (Haidt, 2003;
Lazarus, 1991).
What is the evolutionary value of compassion? Darwin (1871) asserted that
compassion (“sympathy” in his words) evolved to be an affective instinct; since compassion
might have contributed significantly to humans’ survival and well-being, those groups of
individuals who had compassion flourished best and raised the greatest number of offspring.
Compassion helps individuals to initiate and maintain caring relationships (Kim et al., 2009).
Compassion also facilitates cooperation between and among members of a species to gain
evolutionary advantage, and to protect the weak and those who suffer (Goetz et al., 2010).
Goetz et al. (2010) claimed that compassion generally served three functions: it had
emerged as a desirable trait that facilitated supportive relations between non-kin,
compassionate individuals were preferred mates, and it had evolved as part of the caregiving
response to vulnerable offspring.

Next, I will elaborate on these functions.

Three evolutionary functions of compassion: Now that after tens of thousands years of
evolution today’s humans have inherited and still maintain compassion, what is the
evolutionary value of compassion? Some scholars (Frank, 1988; Keltner, 2009; Sober &
Wilson, 1998) claimed that compassion, a distinct affective trait that helps humans survive
and thrive, had emerged and had been maintained for three reasons: 1). Compassion could
help people to form and predict cooperative relationships with non-kin; 2). Compassion was a
desirable emotion or quality for individuals to win mates and thus reproduce. 3). Compassion
was crucial for people to raise their young offspring.
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The first evolutionary function that compassion serves is helping people to form
cooperative connections with non-kin (Axelrod, 1984; Frank, 1988; Nesse, 2007).
Compassion works with other emotions, such as affinity, appreciation, anger and shame, to
facilitate individuals without kinships to initiate and maintain mutually beneficial behavior
and relationships (Trivers, 1971; Gintis, 2000; Nesse, 1990).

In other words, compassion

has evolved to be an affective state and trait to motivate altruism in mutually beneficial
relationships and supportive environments among people without kinships.
This aspect of evolutionary perspective suggests that people like (and thus tend to
seek) mutually beneficial relationships with compassionate individuals who are non-kin
(Goetz et al., 2010).

Jensen- Campbell et al. (2002) found out that adolescents high in

self-reported agreeableness, which strongly predicted compassionate characteristics (Shiota et
al., 2006), were more accepted by peers and had more friends than adolescents low in
agreeableness.
In addition, gene– culture coevolution theories imply that compassion (and other
pro-social instincts and behavior) evolves to motivate altruism in the context of cultural
norms and values that cherish or reward altruistic behavior, and demean or punish selfish act
(Henrich, 2004; Henrich et al., 2006; Richerson & Boyd, 2005).

These theories suggest that

compassion can serve as an internal reward and motivation for people to follow cooperative
norms (Gintis, 2003).

Maybe this can explain why having compassion for others can make

one feel good about himself.
The second evolutionary argument for the emergence of compassion is that
compassion is a desirable quality in the process of mate selection (Buss & Kenrick, 1998;
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Miller, 2007).

Darwin (1871) has given us evident benefits regarding reproducing with

compassionate individuals, who tend to be compassionate when others are struggling and
thereby more likely to provide care and resources to others and offspring, and to form
supportive communities so crucial to the survival of all community members.

Buss et al.

(1990) find out that in many cultures, kindness is the highest ranked quality considered by
participants when assessing potential intimate partner.

Sensitivity to others’ needs, which is

generated by compassion, is a desirable quality of potential romantic partners (Reis et al.,
2004).

Shiota et al. (2006) show that the attribute of being compassionate correlates

strongly with a secure attachment style, which predicts healthful parenting styles that
contribute significantly to the wellbeing of offspring. In sum, these findings convey that
both men and women desire more compassionate mates, thereby over time increasing the
compassionate traits within the gene pool.

This indicates that, after tens of thousands of

years of evolution, compassion has become human instinct.
The third aspect of the evolutionary argument is that compassion is part of the
physiological caregiving system, which is designed to help humans raise vulnerable,
dependent offspring to reach the age of reproductive maturity and thus to help genes to be
more likely replicated.

Human offspring are born more prematurely and more dependent

than the offspring of any other mammals, so they require tremendous care in order to reach
the age of independence and reproductive maturity (Bowlby, 1969; Hrdy, 2000; Mikulincer
& Shaver, 2003).

This pressure to take care of young offspring leads to many human

adaptive instincts: powerful physiological reactions to infants’ distress vocalizations and
other cues (Berry & McArthur, 1986; Bowlby, 1969); behavior related to attachment between
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the caregiver and offspring (Bell, 2001; Bowlby, 1969); oxytocin and endorphins that are
generated in both the caregiver and offspring when the caregiver is giving soothing touch and
calming tone of voice (Hertenstein, 2002); and compassion, which helps caregiver tune into
the dependent offspring’s needs.

Darwin (1959) argued that humans had evolved to have

the instinctual tendency to feel compassion (or sympathy, in his words) for dependent
offspring in times of need or distress would have directly increased the chances of offspring
surviving and eventually becoming reproductive mature.
The evolutionary value of self-critical emotions: As discussed above, desire for
social connections is human instinct, because social connections make it possible for humans
to survive and thrive.

In other words, the lack of social connection is against human nature,

thereby causing distress to people.

Oakley et al. (2012) maintain that social exclusion,

including anticipated social exclusion, is painful, and therefore humans make tremendous
efforts to fit in and ensure their belonging to groups.

Therefore, humans have evolved to

have self-critical emotions (e.g. shame and guilt) to protect us from losing social connections,
by making us examine our thoughts, feelings, impulses and behavior.
Shame, guilt and self-criticism: Brown (2007) defines shame as the intensely painful
feeling a person experiences when believing that he is flawed and therefore unworthy of love
or belonging.

In contrast, she (Brown, 2007) defines guilt as the psychological discomfort

one feels when he has done things that are against his values.

Therefore, according to

Brown, shame is toward a person’s sense of self and it reflects humans’ fear of disconnection
with other people, whereas guilt is toward one’s behavior.
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The differences between shame

and guilt, for example, can be demonstrated as the differences between “I am bad” and “I did
something bad” (Brown et al., 2011).
Brown et al. (2011) conclude from their research that shame can be understood as a
psycho-social-cultural construct, which cannot be considered exclusively psychological,
social or cultural.

The psychological component of shame is associated with one’s emotions,

thoughts and behavior.

The social component relates to the way a person experiences

shame in the context of interpersonal relationships.

The cultural component reflects the

powerful influence of cultural expectations on people – shame and fear of shame that are
resulted from not meeting cultural expectations.
Shame and its evolutionary value: Since shame usually presents in the form of
self-criticism, I use shame and self-criticism interchangeably in this paper.
humans’ instinctual reaction to our own suffering.

Self-criticism is

Why so?

Shame and guilt can help people examine their behavior, thoughts and feelings,
thereby helping them form and maintain connections with others.

McLaren (2010) claims

that shame and guilt arise when a person’s boundary and integrity have been broken by
something he has done that is wrong or that he has been convinced is wrong.

She (McLaren,

2010) further explains that guilt and shame are crucial because they help a person monitor his
behavior, thoughts and feelings, thereby ensuring that his behavior are socially acceptable,
decent and honorable; or guilt and shame can guide him to correct his mistakes.

Without

these two emotions, one will be haunted by his inappropriate behavior, compulsions and
addictions, thereby losing any relational skills or social connections (McLaren, 2010).
Brene Brown points out in an interview (from the Self-Acceptance Project with the publisher
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Sounds True) that shame, usually presenting in the form of self-criticism, helps us fit in the
communities that we care about, and therefore, shame serves our desire to be connected with
other people. She (Brown) further claims that, without shame, humans would not have the
capacity for empathy or connection, because we would behave improperly and thus lose
social connections.

Baumeister and Leary (1995) suggest that many episodes of guilt can be

understood as humans’ natural responses to disturbances or threats to interpersonal
connections.

Therefore, I can conclude that shame, guilt and self-criticism are human

instincts.
The evolutionary perspective tells us that, emotions, such as compassion and shame,
are essentially affective adaptations that help humans survive and thrive by, for example,
initiating and maintaining interpersonal relations and meaningful connections, helping people
to act in socially acceptable ways, and guiding people to correct their mistakes (Oakley et al.,
2012).

Evolutionary theories inform me to maintain that it is human instinct to be both

compassionate for others and critical of ourselves.

Evolutionary theories support my

hypothesis that people without self-compassion (or self-critical people) can still have
compassion for other people.
In the next section, I will discuss, from the neurobiological perspective, why
compassion for others can make people feel “good”.

I will also present how neurobiological

findings show the differences between compassion and other similar emotions.
Neurobiological findings can also shed light on why compassionate people sometimes have
no compassion for those who suffer.
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The Neurobiological Perspective
In this section, I will use neurobiology to support my thesis statement that it is
possible for people without self-compassion to have compassion for others.
Neurobiological studies have shed light on how compassion for others can make a person feel
“good”, which can support my thesis statement by suggesting that it is possible for one to feel
compassion for others, whether he has self-compassion or not.

Neuroscience also

illuminates the differences between compassion and other similar emotions.

Besides,

Neurobiological findings can help us understand the appraisal processes one always goes
through before generating compassion for those who suffer, which may explain why
compassionate people sometimes have no compassion for sufferers (Goetz et al., 2010).
Compassion: As I mentioned earlier, compassion refers to such an emotion one feels
when witnessing other people’s suffering that the witness feels moved by others’ suffering,
understands their suffering, deeply feels for them and subsequently feels an instinctual
motivation to alleviate their suffering (Haidt, 2003; Lazarus, 1991).

Many PHP clients

reported that being compassionate toward others could make them feel “good”.

So what is

the biological basis underneath this?
How compassion can make people feel “good”: Panksepp et al. (1985) point out that
opioids mediate both humans’ tendency to form social connections and the difficult emotions
(e.g. sadness, anxiety) people feel when losing social bonds; social connections stimulate
opioid production, whereas social loss impedes it.

Therefore, according to Panksepp et al.

(1985), humans’ tendency to seek and form social connections is caused by not only the
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actual benefits of having social connections (e.g. sharing resources and fighting against
enemies) but also physiological influence.
There is another factor that can contribute to people’s “good” feelings when having
compassion for others.

Neuroimaging findings can illuminate the neural mechanism

underlying these “good” feelings -- intrinsic reward feelings may occur as a result of
experiencing compassion for other people (Sprecher & Fehr, 2006).” Research suggests that
being compassionate toward other people can modulate the activities of the brain region -the fronto-midbrain–ventral striatum/septal region network— that is known to be implicated
in the prosocial motivation (e.g. to approach, help and sooth others who suffer) and the
accompanied rewarding feelings (Delgado, 2007; McClure et al., 2004; Batson et al., 1983;
Eisenberg et al., 1989; Haidt, 2003).

In addition, researchers have found that both pleasant

and unpleasant facial expressions can activate the reward processing areas of the brain when
people are experiencing compassion (Phan et al. 2002; Kim et al., 2009 ).

This finding

suggests that compassion for others can activate the neural regions of reward, whether this
compassionate person can receive benefits from others or not; hence, Kim et al. (2009)
conclude that inner happiness may depend on one’s compassionate attitude rather than on the
external benefits.

Therefore, I speculate that feeling compassion for others can bring about

humans’ intrinsic reward, thereby making people feel good.
The differences between compassion and other similar emotions: It might be
confusing for many people to differentiate compassion from similar and relevant emotions,
such as empathy, distress, sadness, love, sympathy and pity.
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In this section, I will show the

differences between compassion and each of these emotions, through the lens of
neurobiology.
Empathy: Empathy can be defined as the human capacity to understand and share
another person’s emotions without confusing them with one’s own emotional state (Klimecki
& Singer, 2013).
empathy.

The mirror neuron system is one of the physiological foundations for

This system helps people create internal simulations of much of other people’s

behavior, emotions, thoughts and sensations that they observe (Klimecki & Singer, 2013).
This system also makes the observer have the brain activity similar to the brain activity of the
person who is being observed, as if the observer is actually having those behavior (Oakley et
al., 2012).
Empathy and compassion are different.

Hein and Singer (2008) claim that empathy

does not necessarily lead to a pro-social motivation, whereas compassion motivates people to
approach and help others.

Although one must empathize with other people before

experiencing compassion for them, empathy can be used malevolently (Hein & Singer, 2008).
For instance, one can use empathy to find other people’s weakness in order to hurt them,
which is the opposite of being compassionate toward them.
Distress: Study shows that empathy can give rise to two opposite consequences,
compassion and distress (Klimecki & Singer, 2013).

Klimecki and Singer (2013) claim that

when one experiences compassion for others, he feels the natural urge to help them.

In

contrast, distress refers to the emotional state one feels when his empathic experience that is
triggered by others’ suffering becomes overwhelming to him (Klimecki & Singer, 2013).
Distress often leads to withdrawal behavior that is motivated by one’s desire to protect
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himself from other people’s difficult emotions (Klimecki & Singer, 2013).

Although a

distressed person, when witnessing others’ struggles, can make an effort to reduce their
suffering, his seemingly altruistic behavior are actually his way to reduce his own discomfort
that is caused by this empathic experience (Klimecki & Singer, 2013).

Compassion is

distinct from distress -- the former is other-oriented whereas the latter is self-oriented; to be
specific, compassion activates one’s concern for other people and promotes a desire and
actions to reduce others’ suffering, whereas distress motivates one’s focus on himself and
promotes a desire to reduce his own suffering (Batson, 1991; Batson et al., 1987; Eisenberg
& Miller, 1987).
Sadness: Sadness is an emotional response to loss (Goetz et al., 2010).

McLaren

(2010) points out the importance of sadness (p.295), “Sadness helps you slow down, feel
your losses, and release that which needs to be released -- … behavior or ideas that take you
away from your authentic self… Sadness also has an important biological healing component:
tears cleanse your eyes and sinuses and release toxins (and excess tension) from your body.”
Sadness and compassion are different.

The experience of compassion is associated

with the lowered heart rate and vagal activity, whereas the experience of sadness is associated
with the heightened sympathetic autonomic arousal (Goetz et al., 2010).
expressions of sadness often elicit compassion from other people.

Besides, the

In addition, Shaver et al.

(1987) finds out that, generally, an individual’s own loss makes him sad, but other people’s
loss makes him feel compassion.
Love: Love has many forms (Fehr & Russell, 1991), but maternal love and romantic
love, the two closest forms of love to compassion, are very different from compassion (Goetz
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et al., 2010).

These two forms of love focus on affection, the motivation to be physically

and emotionally close, and the appreciation of the other, promoting positive attachments to
offspring or romantic partners, respectively (Goetz et al., 2010).

Besides, Goetz et al. (2010)

claim that compassion usually arises after one witnesses others’ negative events, whereas
love generally emerges after one experiences positive events with other people.

In addition,

previous study has shown that compassion and love are conveyed in different facial, postural,
and tactile actions (Goetz et al., 2010).
Therefore, love and compassion are different.

So this research is irrelevant about

studying whether one can truly love other people before he can love himself.
Sympathy and pity: Compassion is different from sympathy or pity.

Eisenberg et al.

(1994) define sympathy as an emotional reaction to other people’s misfortunes that involves
feelings of concern and sorrow for those people.

A person who feels sympathy for

unfortunate people does not necessarily want to relieve their pain, whereas a person who feels
compassion for others has the natural urge to alleviate their pain.

Goetz et al. (2010) define

pity as the emotion one feels when having sympathy for those to whom he considers himself
superior.
The opposite phenomenon: What about times when compassionate people do not
have compassion for those who suffer? It is also not unusual to see incidents that are the
opposite of my focal phenomenon.

In their studies, Klimecki and Singer (2013) found out

that, in certain situations, some stimuli that brought about participants’ empathic responses
failed to elicit their compassion; in fact, these stimuli evoked the opposite -- schadenfreude -the joy of witnessing other people’s miseries.
	
  

28	
  

Compassion arises conditionally.

People always go through certain appraisal

processes before generating compassion for those in pain.

I will talk about these

compassion appraisal processes from both the evolutionary perspective and the
neurobiological perspective.
The appraisal processes of compassion -- the evolutionary perspective: Generally
speaking, before generating compassion for those who suffer, one has to appraise two things:
whether those people are worthy of compassion, and whether he himself is emotionally
capable of feeling compassion for them (Goetz et al., 2010).
Sufferers’ deservingness of compassion: Based on the assumption that altruistic
people can choose the recipient of their compassion (Frank, 1988; Hamilton, 1964; Henrich,
2004; Trivers, 1971), evolutionary analysts maintain that deservingness of compassion is
essential to the compassion appraisal processes that aim at determining whether a sufferer
deserves compassion (Goetz et al., 2010).

Aristotle argued that deserved suffering would

lead to blame and reproach, whereas undeserved suffering would elicit compassion
(Nussbaum, 1996, 2001). From the evolutionary perspective, altruistic individuals must be
selective and interact with other pro-social individuals in order to benefit from mutual
cooperation and avoid being exploited by selfish individuals (Goetz et al., 2010).
Next, I will introduce a few factors that often help compassionate people decide
whether a sufferer deserves compassion or not: 1). The sufferer’s controllability and
responsibility, 2). The sufferer’s characters, and 3). the closeness between the compassionate
and the suffering.
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The appraisal of controllability is a crucial indicator in determining whether a sufferer
deserves compassion (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).

Goetz et al. (2010) conclude from a study

that people generally tend to feel compassion toward those who suffer from miseries that are
out of human control (e.g. born-blindness and experience of childhood abuse).

Another

indicator of compassion deservingness is the extent to which one is responsible for his
suffering.

If the sufferer were considered as responsible for his misfortunes (e.g. being lazy

or violent), he would be unlikely to win compassion from other people (Weiner et al., 1988).
Sufferers’ characters are key factors in the deservingness appraisal processes (Feather,
2006; Weiner, 1985).

Suffering people’s positive reputation, warmth and trustworthiness

generally indicate good characters, and thereby these sufferers are often likely to elicit others’
compassion (Fiske et al., 2006; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971).
People tend to help, and presumably feel compassion for, those to whom they are
genetically related (Burnstein et al., 1994; Cialdini et al., 1997; Cheng et al., 2010; Xu et al.,
2009); the closer the kinship is, the more likely one would feel compassion for (Hamilton,
1964).

People also tend to have compassion for those who are emotionally close

(Korchmaros & Kenny, 2001).

Besides, people are more likely to feel compassion for those

who are similar to themselves in areas such as values, behavior, preferences and physical or
psychological characteristics (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987).
The emotional coping abilities of the compassionate people: The appraisal of one’s
own emotional coping abilities is a key factor in generating his compassion for other people
(Goetz et al., 2010).

It would be more likely for a person to feel compassion for others

when he feels capable of emotionally coping with those people’s misfortunes (Eisenberg et
	
  

30	
  

al., 1994; Gross, 1998).

In contrast, the appraisal of low emotional coping ability would

activate one’s distress, sadness or even fear when witnessing others’ suffering (Hoffman,
1981; Roseman et al., 1990).

In sum, a person’s ability to emotionally cope with the

distressing situation at hand is positively related to generating compassion and negatively
related to generating distress (Mikulincer et al., 2001; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003;
Mikulincer et al., 2005).
The appraisal processes of compassion -- the neurobiological perspective:
Combining their conceptual analysis of compassion and neurobiological studies of regions of
the brain, Goetz et al. (2010) suggest that feeling compassion toward others involves the
following processes: recognizing another person’s suffering expressions (temporal parietal
cortex), mirroring the person’s emotional experience (interior frontal cortex, insula, temporal
pole), evaluating whether this person deserves his miseries (midventral mPFC), coping with
empathic distress (dorsal mPFC/interior frontal cortex), feeling tenderness or warmth toward
this sufferer (periaqueductal gray, substantia nigra, and ventral tegmental area) and feeling
motivation to approach the suffer (heightened left hemisphere).
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CHAPTER V
Object Relations Theories
In this chapter, I discuss, through the lens of object relations theories, how childhood
abuse by primary caregivers would lead to my phenomenon.

I will also use object relations

theories to support my hypothesis that it is possible for people without self-compassion to
still have compassion for other people.
Overview of Object Relations Theories and Their Major Concepts
Object relations theories explore the processes by which people come to experience
themselves as separate and independent from others, while at the same time needing
connections with others (Berzoff et al., 2011).

One of the most basic ideas of object

relations theories is that human beings have a primary, absolute need for attachment (Berzoff
et al., 2011).

Object relations theories focus on how individuals internalize (take in) actual,

external interactions that they have with other people, and on the significant influence these
internalized relationships have on these individuals (Berzoff et al., 2011).

Berzoff et al.

(2011) maintain that, “Object relations theory is based on the belief that all people have
within them an internal, often unconscious world of relationships that is different and in
many ways more powerful and compelling than what is going on in their external world of
interactions with “real” and present people (p.118-119).” One’s internal world consists of
mental representations of the self and of others, representations formed by experiences,
memories and ideas with the external, real world (Berzoff et al., 2011).
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Meanwhile, these

internal representations have an “enduring existence (Berzoff et al., 2011, p.131).” A
person’s internal representations of object experiences from the past can color or shape
present relationships in his inner world.

As Berzoff et al. (2011) put it, “These

representations are not observable and may not reflect the actual situation, but they are the
content of the internal world and the building blocks from which relationships with the self
and with others are ultimately formed (p.131).”
Goldstein (2001) talked about human development through the lens of object relations
theory (p.8), “Early infant-caretaker interactions lead to the person internalizing basic
attitudes toward the self and others, characteristic relational patterns, and a repertoire of
defenses and internal capacities.

Important developmental processes involve attachment,

separation-individuation, early object loss, experiences with frustrating or bad objects, and
the move from dependence to independence.” Hence, it seems plausible that childhood
abuse by primary caregivers would have a profound, enduring impact on a person’s
self-image, representations of others and his sense of human relationships in general in the
world.
Now I will introduce some background of object relations theories.

Goldstein (2001)

says that “Like Freud, Klein emphasized the power of the instincts, particularly the
aggressive drive, but unlike him, she argued that the goal of life was relationships with others
(objects) rather than instinctual gratification (p.31).” Goldstein (2001) also talks about
Fairbairn, whose theories are vastly different from Freud’s, “Arguing that human beings
possess a primary drive toward relating to others, Fairbairn totally rejected Freud’s concept
of an innate aggressive drive and instead argued that the frustration of not feeling loved or
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lovable, or that one’s love is welcome and valued, results in aggressive impulses. …
Fairbairn envisioned the ego as a holistic and intact structure that possessed its own energy
and potentialities and that was directed at object-seeking rather than pleasure-seeking (P.
34).”
Next I am going to introduce some major concepts of object relations theories.
Concepts
In object relations theories, an “object” refers to a person or a thing “outside of the
self that the self perceives, experiences, desires, fears, rejects or takes in (Berzoff et al., 2011,
p.120).” Objects refer mostly to people, real or internalized, including their qualities and
contributions to the relationships with the self (Berzoff et al., 2011), although, as Berzoff et al.
(2011) put it, “other things such as music, art, the weather, or even medications can become
objects when they are deeply and symbolically connected to powerful object experiences in
the inner world (, p.120).”
The term object relations refers to not only “real” relationships with others, but also
the internalized relationships. Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) maintained that, “people react
to and interact with not only an actual other but also an internal other, a psychic
representation of a person which in itself has the power to influence both the individual’s
affective states and his overt behavioral reactions (p.10)- Goldstein (2011).”
Self-hate is another important concept in this paper.

I use the definitions of self-hate

in Rubin and Rubin (1975), “We engage in self-hate when we hate any aspect of ourselves
and whenever we have feelings of self-contempt generally. … The [self-hating] process
ranges from and includes mild feelings of discontent to contempt, disgust and abhorrence.
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It goes on to include sabotaging decisions, moves and activities against one’s actual self and
ultimately, suicide. … Any distortion of self, either in degradation or idealization, must be
viewed as rejection of actual self and is therefore self-hating.
to one’s abilities are self-hating.

Thus, exaggerated opinions as

Minimizing and ignoring one’s abilities are no more, no

less, self-hating. … Any thought, feeling or action based on any combination of false beliefs,
which in any direct or indirect way detracts from, depletes, denigrates or hurts that which is
real and actual about oneself, must be considered as part of the self-hating process (p.9-10).”
Now I am going to introduce the defense mechanisms evolved in this paper.

They

are internalization (including introjection and identification), idealization, reaction formation,
moral defense, projection and projective identification.

Defenses, whatever forms they take,

are all essentially used to help people to ward off unwanted feelings, wishes or impulses that
have arisen in unconsciousness.
Berzoff et al. (2011) contend that, “Central to object relations theory is the belief that
human beings are … constantly taking in [internalizing] from the world outside ourselves
messages, ideas, attitudes, feelings, whole people, parts of people, and good and bad
experiences (p.141).” Two main forms of internalizations are introjection and identification.
Introjection refers to the processes of internalizing parts of the object or the whole
relationship with the object (Berzoff et al., 2011).

We introject both good and bad object

experiences and people’s internal world is filled with both

(Berzoff et al., 2011).

Identification refers to the process in which what is taken in is a valued part of the object
(Berzoff et al., 2011).

Another important defense is idealization, which is used to push

uncomfortable or even painful feelings into unconsciousness, such as disappointment,
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sadness and anger (Berzoff et al., 2011).
understanding my phenomenon.

Reaction formation is another helpful defense in

Berzoff et al. (2011) explain that, “This defense transforms

an unacceptable wish into an acceptable one. … When individuals employ reaction
formation, … the wishes of which they are consciously aware are the exact opposites of the
wishes they actually [unconsciously] want to fulfill. … [Thus] expressed love can conceal
hatred, expressed mercy can conceal cruelty (p.81).” Besides, Fairbairn talked about moral
defense.

He believed that “the child’s response to a frustrating environment is a moral

defense, in which he or she represses his or her perceptions of the parents as bad, continues to
view the objects in the external world as good, sees himself or herself as bad, and constructs a
world of inner bad objects to which the child remains related and over which the child retains
the illusion of control [thereby getting a sense of security] (Goldstein, 2001, p.60).” In
addition, projection refers to the defense in which people get rid of unwanted feelings (parts
of the self) and place them in other people, thereby disavowing those parts or feelings of the
self (Berzoff et al., 2011).

Moreover, when a person (the projector) is engaged in projective

identification, he unconsciously projects certain uncomfortable feelings onto an object
(another person, the recipient) so then the object begins to feel what has been projected and
thus behaves accordingly (Berzoff et al., 2011).
Melanie Klein’s two developmental positions are also important for my research.
Klein contributed her understanding about the development of the internal world.

She

talked about two developmental, internal “positions”: paranoid-schizoid position and the
depressive position.

Each describes an internal state of object relations, a way of perceiving

the world that happens early in life but can be present throughout the life span (Berzoff et al.,
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2011).

Paranoid-schizoid position reflects the earliest way of being.

The name of the

position sounds pathological, but it is meant to capture a normal developmental stage when
the daily life is experienced by infants as terrifying moments filled with pieces, surprises,
happiness and terror.

Every infant has to go through this position because he is so little,

vulnerable and dependent, and does not have the capacity to understand the world, thereby
feeling unsafe at times, no matter how well loved and protected he is (Berzoff et al., 2011).
Berzoff et al. (2011) point out that an infant’s primary anxiety at this position is that
frightening parts of objects “will get inside the self, overwhelm it, and even annihilate it
(p.132).” Berzoff et al. (2011) also mention that, “Klein named objects as they are
experienced in the paranoid-schizoid position ‘part objects’ in order to capture the
fragmented way the world looks when a person is, or feels, too little to perceive the whole
(p.132).”
According to Klein, the depressive position, the more advanced position, starts “when
the toddler begins to have enough experience to realize that the good person who feeds him
and nuzzles him and keeps him warm and the bad person who sometimes puts him down
harshly or keeps him waiting for his food or his diaper change are one and the same.
Perhaps even more upsetting is that the person [the toddler], the self [the toddler himself],
who loves [the object, the parent] is also the person who hates [the object] (Berzoff et al.,
2011, p.133).” At this developmental position, toddlers start to see that both the self and
others (objects) have both “good” and “bad” qualities and that no one is all “good” or all
“bad.” Similarly, this position is normal and reflects healthy development, but its name
indicates the depressing reality that people have to understand -- the self and objects are
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complicated and contain both “good” or “bad” qualities, a reality that can be difficult to
comprehend for even mature adults (Berzoff et al., 2011).
The True self, the False self, “good-enough” and “holding environment” are also
helpful in understanding my phenomenon.

Object relations theorists have recognized the

significance of parental attunement to a child’s genuine, unique needs and qualities in order
to help him achieve optimal development.

Guntrip (1973, p.181) claimed that, “When a

baby is born, he contains a core of uniqueness that has never existed before.

The parents’

responsibility is not to mold, shape, pattern, or condition him, but to support him in such a
way that his precious hidden uniqueness shall be able to emerge and guide his whole
development (Goldstein, 2001, p.38).” Similarly, Winnicott used the concept “holding
environment” to reflect his idea that it is crucial for the child’s healthy growth that his
primary caregiver is able to “adapt to and respond to a child’s needs in personal and unique
ways (Goldstein, 2001, p.75).” Berzoff et al. (2011) explain that, “By holding environment,
Winnicott did not mean only the literal holding, but the capacity of the mother to create the
world in such a way for the baby that she feels held, safe, and protected from the dangers
without and protected as well from the danger of emotions within (p.127).” Winnicott
further qualified his ideas by saying that “the mother [primary caregivers] does not have to be
perfect for healthy development to occur.

She just has to be ‘good enough,’ and the most

important quality the good-enough mother possesses is a capacity for attunement to the
baby’s changing developmental needs (Berzoff et al., 2011, p.127).”

Goldstein (2001)

maintain that, “Important features of this holding environment are the mother’s sensitivity to
the infant [child], her ability to avoid too much deprivation or impingement on the infant, her
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skill in allowing the infant to feel that she is under the infant’s control, and her consistency
and reliability despite inevitable failures (p.76).” In a good-enough mother’s holding
environment, from Winnicott’s view, a child’s True self would be able to emerge and grow.
Goldstein (2001) pointed out that, “According to Winnicott, the True self represents an
individual’s core potentialities and develops when there is good-enough mothering.

He

thought that maternal failure, particularly in the form of impingements on the child, as might
be reflected in overly strict expectations, leads the child to create a False self that adapts to
the mother and the surrounding environment at the expense of the True self.

As the False

self, which is a façade aimed at pleasing others, becomes more rigid, it becomes split off and
the person becomes alienated from his or her True self, which remains hidden (p.77).”
Winnicott “believed that attachment needs to be flexible and genuine enough to nurture the
True Self, which is the repository of individuality and uniqueness.

In relationships

characterized by genuine attachment, the separate individuality of both people is seen,
respected and encouraged to flourish.

But if the child’s striving for separateness is thwarted,

the holding environment can become a prison. … A True Self cannot emerge if the child feels
she must be attuned to the needs of others in the family system and a certain way in order to
be recognized and acknowledged.

What happens instead is that the child may develop a

False Self, one that seeks to suppress individuality and molds itself to the needs of others.
This False Self, trying hard to be responsive and to take care of others, ultimately becomes
overly compliant.

Uniqueness, vibrancy, idiosyncrasy, difference are all submerged.

this debilitating, constricting process, … the True Self is lost (Berzoff et al., 2011, p.130).”
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In

In the next chapter, the discussion chapter, I will apply object relations theories to the
case of Joanne.
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CHAPTER VI
Discussion
Summary of key points of each theory
Evolutionary and Neurobiological Theories: From the viewpoint of evolutionary
theories, both compassion and self-criticism are essentially adaptive instincts that can help
humans to meet their instinctual desire of belonging and connecting with others in order to
survive and thrive.

To be specific, compassion for others can help a person to be accepted

by social groups, and self-criticism can help a person examine and correct inappropriate
emotions and behavior, which can prevent him from being rejected by his communities.

In

a word, humans instinctually tend to be both compassionate for others and critical of
themselves.
From the neurobiological perspective, feeling compassion for others can make a
person feel “good” physiologically.

In other words, it is possible for one to feel compassion

for others, whether he has self-compassion or not.

Besides, neurobiological findings can

illuminate the appraisal processes a person always goes through before generating
compassion for those who suffer, which may explain why compassionate people sometimes
have no compassion for sufferers.
In sum, evolutionary and neurobiological theories support my hypothesis that people
without self-compassion (or self-critical people) can still have compassion for other people.
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Objection Relations Theories: Object relations theories claim that every person has
within him an internal, often unconscious, world full of mental representations of the self and
of others, representations formed by experiences, memories and ideas with the external, real
world (Berzoff et al., 2011).

A person’s internal representations of the self and of objects

from the past can color present relationships in his inner world.

Goldstein (2001) talked

about human development through the lens of object relations theory (p.8), “Early
infant-caretaker interactions lead to the person internalizing basic attitudes toward the self
and others, characteristic relational patterns, and a repertoire of defenses and internal
capacities.” Hence, it seems plausible that childhood abuse by primary caregivers would
have a profound, enduring impact on a person’s self-image, representations of others, and his
sense of human relationships in general in the world.
In my application of object relations theories, my discussion is based on the
assumption that people can have compassion for those toward whom they have a positive
regard.

Therefore, people can have self-compassion only if they have a positive self-image,

and I infer that people in my phenomenon probably have both negative self-images and
positive object-representations of other people.

I use object relations theories to analyze

how childhood abuse by primary caregivers may contribute to these compassionate people’s
self-hate and their high regard for others who suffer in similar ways.
In Chapter four, I discuss how people’s use of some defense mechanisms may lead to
their self-hate (thus their lack of self-compassion) while keeping their positive regard for
other people (thus compassion for others).

These defenses are internalization (including

introjection and identification), idealization, reaction formation, moral defense, projection
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and projective identification.

Klein’s two developmental positions can also illuminate these

compassionate people’s self-hate and positive object-representations.

Besides, infants are

born with the instinct to trust their primary caregivers 100% (Goldstein, 2001) and would
thereby blame themselves when having upsetting experiences with their parents.

In addition,

the concepts of True and False self can also illuminate my phenomenon.
In a word, object relations theories support my hypothesis that it is possible that
people without self-compassion (or self-critical people) have compassion for other people.
Ideas the two theories share: Discussions from earlier chapters tell me that the
evolutionary, neurobiological theories and object relations theory share the following ideas.
Both theories claim that humans are social creatures who have the instinct and absolute need
to form and maintain relationships with other people.

Additionally, both theories maintain

that it is infants’ and children’s instinct to trust their adult caregivers 100% and stay with
them (their caregivers) by all means, including blaming themselves when hurt by their
caregivers.

From the evolutionary perspective, “children who desired to stay together with

adults (and who would resist being left alone) would be more likely to survive until their
reproductive years than other children because they would be more likely to receive care and
food as well as protection (Goetz et al., 2010).” Object relations theories argue that children
idealize their parents and takes in their (parents’) opinions, attitudes and behavior without
question (Goldstein, 2001), so they can get a sense of security, even though at the expense of
blaming themselves when frustrated by their parents.
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The Case of Joanne
Next I am going to apply both the evolutionary, neurobiological theories and object
relations theories to the case of Joanne, the PHP client whom I described earlier.
Application of Evolutionary/Neurobiological theories: Joanne seemed to be nice to
every one (e.g. her children, colleagues, other PHP clients etc.), but not to herself.

Perhaps

her “double standards” simply are a manifestation of human instinct that humans evolved to
have the tendency to be both compassionate for others and critical of themselves.

Her

compassion and self-criticism could be viewed as affective adaptations that helped her form
and maintain positive social relationships.

She was compassionate and caring, which helped

her be well liked at work and at PHP. She was able to raise her children and keep her job,
which perhaps partially resulted from her self-criticism so that she could minimize her
inappropriate impulses and behavior and motivate her to correct her mistakes.

It was likely

that self-criticism played an important role in helping her be a responsible person both at
work and at home.
From the neurobiological perspective, feeling compassion for others can make a
person feel “good” physiologically.

Joanne said, “taking care of other people makes me

feel good about myself”, which can be understood as the result of the activation of the reward
processing areas of the brain when people are experiencing compassion (Phan et al. 2002;
Kim et al., 2009 ).
Application of Object Relations Theories: My research is based on the assumption
that people generally tend to have compassion for those whom they appreciate and admire; in
other words, in the language of object relations theories, a person has compassion only for
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people (objects) whose images (object-representations) are positive in this person’s internal
world.

Therefore, positive object-representations are necessary for a person to generate

compassion for these objects.

By the same token, a positive self-representation is necessary

for a person to have self-compassion. Now that these compassionate people in my
phenomenon do not have compassion for themselves, I can predict that these people have
both negative self-representations (self-images) and positive object-representations for others
who have similar struggles.

Therefore, the key to decode my phenomenon would be to

discover how these compassionate people form these internal self-representations and
object-representations.

For the purpose of this thesis, I use object relations theories to

analyze how childhood abuse by primary caregivers may contribute to these compassionate
people’s self-hate and their high regard for others who suffer in similar ways.
Many object relations theorists have agreed on the idea that early relationships with
primary caregivers have an enduring, significant impact on children’s perceptions of others
and of the self (object-representations and self-representations).

Berzoff et al. (2011)

maintain that, “The fullness and quality of a person’s inner world is greatly influenced by the
quality of early relationships (p.126).” “Infants begin to form images of themselves
(self-representations) and others (object-representations) by taking in experiences with those
close to them [primary caregivers].”

Goldstein (2001) claims that, “Early infant-caretaker

interactions lead to the person internalizing basic attitudes toward the self and others,
characteristic relational patterns, and a repertoire of defenses and internal capacities (p.8).”
“Once formed [commonly during childhood], self- and object-representations are
fundamental internal structures that affect the ways in which individuals view themselves and
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others.” Berzoff et al. (2011) provided “powerful evidence of the object relations view that
later self-esteem is constructed by earlier relational experiences (p.386).”
So how may childhood abuse by primary caregivers lead a person to have both
negative self-representation and positive object-representations for others who share similar
struggles? People’s use of various defenses can help answer this question.

Next, I will

apply these defenses to the case of Joanne: introjection, identification, moral defense,
projection, idealization, reaction formation, and projective identification.
Berzoff et al. (2011) said that, “In introjection, what is taken in from outside objects
and object experiences becomes part of the person’s self-representation. … Introjection can
help us [especially children] master our experiences with painful and disappointing objects in
our lives in order to be able to bear the anguish that the people we love and depend on can
also at times be experienced as hateful to us.

The “badness” of the object [parent] is “taken

in” [and thereby becomes part of the self’s self-representation, meaning that the bad feelings
stirred up by the object make the self [child] believe that he himself [child] causes these bad
feelings and therefore he believes “I am bad”], in an attempt to control [and make sense of]
the overwhelming situation, in an attempt not to feel so powerless and to preserve the
positive image of the needed other (p.142).”

Joanne was a childhood abuse survivor.

In

her childhood, her alcoholic father had been emotionally and physically abusive to her, and to
her mother and siblings. It is likely that in childhood she introjected the “badness” of her
father and of her overwhelming life situations so that the “badness” became part of her sense
of self, thereby gaining a sense of security by preserving a positive object-representation of
her father. This can help explain why Joanne blamed herself for the abuse and justified her
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father’s abusive behavior, suggesting that she had both negative self-representations and
positive object-representations of her father.
Berzoff et al. (2011) claimed that, “In identification, selective and valued parts of [the
object] are internalized but remain unconscious.

In Freud’s view, the taking in of parental

rules through the process of identification results in the formation of the superego (p.142).”
This can help understand why Joanne and some compassionate PHP clients failed to have
self-compassion.

Their parents all seemed strict and critical of them (PHP clients) when

they (PHP clients) were little.

These clients might have identified with their parents’

behavior and values: 1. These clients might have identified with their parents’ high standards
toward them (PHP clients) when they were little, so they (PHP clients) gradually became
critical of themselves.

Joanne once confided in a group therapy session that her parents,

especially her father, made her feel “it's either perfect or nothing . . . I guess maybe that’s
why I have unrealistically high expectations for myself”.

Joanne seemed to have identified

her critical parents’ high standards for her so later on she became critical of herself.
her self-image was self-hating (e.g. “I’m stupid. … useless…”).

Thus,

2. Some PHP clients

revealed that they had learned from their parents that it was socially desirable to be
compassionate for the suffering and that it was “selfish” to be kind to one self.
Another defense people may use to maintain both negative self-representations and
positive object-representations is moral defense.

Goldstein (2001) said “Fairbairn focused

on the results of severe environmental frustration and explained how children deal with the
presence of ‘bad’ external objects [parents] taking on the burden of being bad themselves
rather than seeing the parents as bad.
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sense of outer security at the price of inner insecurity [self-hatred]… since it is better to be a
sinner in a world ruled by God [where at least there will be hope of redemption and love]
than to live in a world ruled by the devil [where there would be no hope, rescue or salvation]
(p.34)." It would feel safer to believe that “I’m the only person who is bad in the world and
can do harm, and other people are good” than to feel “other people around can hurt me any
time.” So this might result in Joanne’s negative sense of self and positive
object-representations of other people.
Joanne might use the defense of projection to strengthen both her negative
self-representation and positive object-representations for those who have similar struggles.
Unconsciously, Joanne might know that she had many good qualities.

But her self-image

was so negative that knowing that she had good qualities could be anxiety provoking because
knowing she was good could shift her negative sense of self.

Thus she might have

unconsciously projected some of her positive, but unwanted, self-regard (e.g. kind, smart,
responsible) onto other people.

Now that some of her “goodness” was projected onto others,

Joanne would thus perceive the recipients of her projection as more positive than they
actually were, and perceive herself as more negative than she truly was.
The use of idealization might also help Joanne reinforce both her negative self-image
and her positive object-representations of her abusive parents.

The little Joanne might have

idealized her parents in order to justify their abusive behavior, thereby pushing her painful
feelings of being abused into unconsciousness.

Thus, she could tolerate their abuse and

could still perceive them as “good parents” in order to feel safe living with them.
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Joanne’s expressed compassion could result from her defense of reaction formation.
She sometimes complained about “taking care of other people all the time.” What happened
might be, when first seeing some suffering people, Joanne might have unconsciously
experienced aggression toward them, because she considered them weak, needy and
distressing. But then she immediately felt guilty for her lack of mercy.

In order to ward

off this anxiety, she unconsciously generated the opposite – compassion-- for them.

Her

compassion concealed her initial unconscious negative judgment toward those suffering
people.
When someone (the projector) is engaged in projective identification, he
unconsciously projects certain uncomfortable feelings onto an object (another person, the
recipient) so then the object began to feel what has been projected and thus behaves
accordingly. So after that the projector can identify those projected feelings with the object
(Berzoff et al., 2011; Goldstein, 2001).

T. H. Ogden proposes that one may use projective

identification to distance himself from an unwanted part of himself, but he does not want to
lose that part completely, so he keeps that unwanted part alive in the object (the recipient),
maybe to study this part from the object (Berzoff et al., 2011).
on my phenomenon.

This defense can shed light

Joanne felt compassion for others perhaps because, although

consciously she hated herself and believed that she deserved suffering, she unconsciously had
compassion for herself – after all, she knew how painful it was to go through her miseries.
She longed for understanding, forgiveness and relief.

But her self-hatred was so intense that

it was almost impossible for her to feel self-compassion.

Unconsciously, she projected her

self-compassion (which felt uncomfortable) onto others.

However, she unconsciously did
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not want to completely lose her self-compassion because unconsciously she longed for it,
which could give her comfort, forgiveness and relief.

So being compassionate toward those

who had similar struggles might be her way to try to sooth her own deep, unconscious
longing.

Joanne might have unconsciously felt a strong connection with those suffering

people, which was the same struggle they all shared.

Her compassion for them might be

motivated by her unconscious wish to relieve her own pain.

To Joanne, those people were

cared for and understood, making her feel, unconsciously, that (part of) herself was cared for
and understood because of her connection with them—it is as if she felt “I have part of you,
so now that you are comforted by my compassion, meaning the part we share is feeling better,
thus part of me is also feeling my self-compassion.”
In addition, Klein’s two developmental positions can also illuminate my phenomenon.
Berzoff et al. (2011) said, “Klein named objects as they are experienced in the
paranoid-schizoid position ‘part objects’ in order to capture the fragmented way the world
looks when a person [mostly an infant] is, or feels, too little to perceive the whole (p.132).”
Berzoff et al. (2011, p.132) claimed that “The main anxiety of this paranoid-schizoid position
is that persecutory parts of objects will get inside the self, overwhelm it, and even annihilate
it.” The introjection of such fear results in a very negative self-representation in the infant’s
internal world.

The seed of a person’s self-hatred is thereby planted.

Berzoff et al. (2011) also talked about the second developmental position: “She [Klein]
saw the depressive position starting when the toddler begins to have enough experience to
realize that the good person who feeds him and nuzzles him and keeps him warm and the bad
person who sometimes puts him down harshly or keeps him waiting for his food or his diaper
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change are one and the same.

Perhaps even more upsetting is that the person, the self, who

loves is also the person who hates.

The loss that comes from this developmental step of

seeing both others and the self as complex and multifaceted is basically a loss of innocence, a
loss of the belief in the possibility of perfection (p.132).”
After reaching the depressive position, children have new ways to feed their
self-hatred.

Children would take in the upsetting aspects of their parents, thereby perceiving

their parents as “dangers monsters”; in children’s internal worlds, such images of their
parents can also be also strengthened by their projection of their own aggressive wishes
toward the parents, since the parents are frustrating at times.

The images of the parents

become very frightening, and children introject such powerful, destructive images of the
parents, thereby compounding children’s negative self-image.

Meanwhile, since children

have already had the capacity of knowing that the upsetting parents are the same people who
love and rear them, they thus feel immense guilt for wishing to harm their parents, which
further strengthens their self-hatred.
As I said earlier, both paranoid-schizoid position and depressive position are natural
and suggest normal, healthy development.

Therefore, although both positions could cause

children to have very negative self-images, those well-loved children have chances to reduce
their self-hatred, as Goldstein (2001) explained, “The child’s taking in of more loving,
accepting, three-dimensional, and human relationships with others may result in a tempering
of the strict and relentless aspects of the ego ideal and the superego (p.59).” The superego
thereby becomes less rigid and punitive.

However, as for children who are continually

exposed to abusive primary caregivers, they have so little loving experiences with their
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parents that their internalized ego ideals remain primitive and unrealistically high.
Goldstein (2001) added, “Internalized images that are highly idealized and perfectionistic in
their demands and harsh and punitive when one does not live up to them continue to
dominate the developing child’s inner world (p.59).” Thus, abused children continue their
self-hatred till adulthood and beyond.
Unfortunately, children have more ways to feed their self-hatred.

Children are born

with the instinct to trust their primary caregivers 100% and would thereby blame themselves
when having upsetting experiences with their parents.

As Goldstein (2001) put it, “Initially,

the child builds up highly idealized views of the parents and takes in their standards without
question (p.58).” Children need to feel that their parents are perfect so they can merge with
these idealized objects (the parents) in order to feel safe, and would generally blame
themselves even when in reality their parents are at fault.

Goldstein (2001) explained that,

“At an early phase of development, infants begin to feel at one with their idealized and
omnipotent loved objects, so much so that their self- and object-representations become
merged—that is, they are unable to distinguish psychically between themselves and those
they love. At this time, good (rewarding) internal images of the self and others are
separated from bad (frustrating) self- and object-images.

Because of the tendency to merge

with the object, the self also feels good when the self experiences loving feelings toward the
object.

Self-esteem results from positive or libidinally charged feelings that are originally

experienced toward others but that become directed at the self-representations.
when the self is angry at the object, the self feels bad and fears punishment.

Conversely,

Jacobson

explained that loss of self-esteem arises when there is so much anger at the object that loving
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feelings are eclipsed and, through the process of identification, anger is then turned against
the self (p.71).” Therefore, now the self becomes both the judge and the criminal.
Goldstein (2001) maintained that, “According to Jacobson, early object loss or intense
feelings of anger at or disappointment in loved ones results in vulnerability to depression
[self-hatred] in later life.

When traumatic experiences occur, aggression toward the object

(parent) overtakes feelings of love.

Consequently, the person is deprived of the ability to

merge with the gratifying and all-powerful idealized image of the object and instead,
devalues the object.

The merger between the self- and object-images results in the self

being denigrated as well, and the person feels worthless (p.71).” Moreover, the child feels
guilty about hating their parents, causing him to feel worse about himself, “I’m bad. I don’t
deserve anyone’s compassion, certainly not mine.

I should be punished.” As Berzoff et al.

(2011) put it, “when children experience a lack of parental understanding and empathy, it
diminishes a child’s self-esteem.

This then leads to angry feelings toward the parent(s),

accompanied by guilt, which further lowers self-esteem . . . Disappointment and fury at the
person who was emotionally depriving are then experienced as disappointment and fury at
the self (p.384)”.
Guntrip, an object relations theorist, can inform us on why it can be difficult for
people to give up their negative self-images.

Berzoff et al. (2011) claim that “Guntrip

believed that the core of psychological distress is simply elementary fear, however much it
gets transformed into guilt: fear carrying with it the feeling of weakness and inability to cope
with life (p.136).” Guntrip also believed that “people would rather think of themselves as
filled with mighty instincts [instinctual drives] than face the greater universal truth of being
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tiny and vulnerable in a powerful and mysterious universe (Berzoff, p.136-p.137).” From
his viewpoint, I infer that maybe unconsciously people feel they “have to” believe that they
are bad and possess powerfully harmful instincts, thereby getting a sense of control and thus
a sense of security.

According to Guntrip, it is better to feel bad but powerful than to feel

good but vulnerable.
The concepts of True self and False self can illuminate the case of Joanne and my
phenomenon.

Berzoff et al. (2011) contend that, “The highly individuated True Self will

not emerge when the environment fails to be genuinely attuned to the child’s uniqueness
(p.130).” This may help understand why many PHP clients attributed their lack of
self-compassion to their habits of taking care of their family members.

They said they were

always and had been used to taking care of other people so that it became “natural” to show
compassion for others, and it became “natural” for them to ignore their own needs or to have
compassion for themselves.

Perhaps, they had grown up in environments where they, as

children, had to adapt to other people’s needs and their primary caregivers failed to tune into
their genuine needs, so that only their False self got accepted and developed.

They are

never used to valuing their own needs, which can contribute to their feelings of
self-worthlessness, and meanwhile these people are used to taking care of others’ needs,
which makes it natural for them to have compassion for others.
Joanne said “I’m always a caregiver.
good about myself.”

Taking care of other people makes me feel

To her, taking care of others seemed always necessary.

This can be

the result of her False self that she grew up feeling obligated to tune into others’ needs.

A

childhood without a good-enough holding environment had led the young Joanne to create a
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False self that adapted to her parents and the surrounding environment at the expense of her
True self.

A False self leads to a person’s conscious and unconscious self-hate (Rubin &

Rubin, 1975).
Besides, Joanne’s “good” feelings associated with being a caregiver could come from
the introjection of her positive experiences when she was accepted and appreciated by others
(especially by her parents when she was little), which might contribute to her sense of
self-worth.

It seemed to me that her sense of self-worth relied mostly on her contribution

for others, as if she would not be a worthy person if she stopped taking care of other people.
Her False self seemed to result in her double standards: she felt she had to take care of other
people, but she did not expect them to “burden” themselves to do things for her.

She felt

guilty for being exhausted taking care of others and felt “selfish” for putting her own
legitimate needs before others’.
The Integration of the two theories: Neurobiological theories maintain that
compassion appraisals include some judgment of fairness or justice (Goetz et al., 2010).
Object Relations theories concern possible reasons why people can have positive
object-representations or negative self-images, or both.

In other words, Object Relations

theories suggest some ways how people form their judgment of fairness or justice.
Summary of Explanations for Focal Phenomenon
1. Evolutionary theories inform us that it is a human instinct to have compassion
when seeing others suffering so they can connect with others.

It is also a human instinct to

be critical of themselves when humans are suffering so they can improve themselves in order
to be accepted by their communities.
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2. Object Relations theories inform us that childhood abuse by primary caregivers
would contribute significantly to a child’s self-hatred.

They can also illuminate how a

compassionate person forms his positive object-representations and negative self-images,
thereby having compassion for others but not for himself.
3. I have come up with a few reasons why people have self-hatred, which may help
understand my phenomenon.

A person’s relationship to himself and to others: To himself,

he believes he’s a hateful, flawed person who’s ugly in his heart, whereas others are better.
By the same token, he believes he’s superior to others.
deserves to be punished.

If he’s worse than others, he feels he

If he’s better than others, he should do better so he should be

punished for not doing better.

Both scenarios come from unrealistic perceptions of reality.

“So”, the person would think, “no matter whether others are better or worse than I am, they
should be forgiven. … I’m no good, so I have to work extra hard to overcome my
deficiencies, so I have unrealistic high standards for myself.

I can be good enough only

when I can achieve much more than other people.”
Some people are critical of themselves because they believe criticism is a great
motivation for accomplishments.
other people from succeeding.

So to these people, being kind to others is like to stop

These people feel bad about themselves for having these

selfish thoughts, further feeding their self-hatred, and care for others because they feel guilty
(reaction formation).
For a person who hates himself and has a terrible sense of self for most of his life, it
can be frightening for him to be good and successful because a positive self-image can
overwhelm him by shaking his sense of himself, his sense of others and his sense of life. It
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can be scary for a person to surpass his parents, especially when his parents are critical,
because he may feel that would betray his gods by being better than they are. He may
unconsciously believe that the only way to connect with his gods (his parents) is to obey his
gods’ opinion, which is that he’s not good enough.
connect with his gods, on whom he totally depends.

Therefore, self-hate becomes his way to
So knowing he is good can mean, to

him, that he has lost his connection with his parents, who mean everything to the child who
still lives in his adult body.

Besides, after being put down by his parents for all his life, it

would be overwhelming for him to succeed.

Success would mean that the parents were

always wrong with their negative opinions toward him, and that he could have never suffered
from his life-long self-hate if his parents had had the correct (positive) opinions toward him.
It can be overwhelming for him to know that his life-long, self-sabotaging self-hatred has in
fact been an illusion.

How can it be easy for anyone to swallow the fact that “I’ve been

miserable all my life for hating myself for nothing”?
One reason for my phenomenon may be that self-blame is less work. It’s easier to
blame oneself than to actually work hard to solve the problem. Besides, self-blame can
make a person feel good about himself because he knows that he is not only the “criminal”,
but also the “judge” who has good sense of what is good and what is bad. By blaming
oneself, a person may feel that he is smart and knows how to solve the problem; the solution
would be “if I were better, the problem would be solved (by me).”

They believe they are

unable to resolve the problem, so in their opinion, the only solution is to blame themselves.
This way, they can feel something good about themselves by telling themselves that “at least
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I have good sense and high standards because I know I’m a piece of garbage.”

These

people may take pride in their self-knowledge, thereby further strengthening their self-hate.
Children are taught to be good but they are not perfect, so children feel they are not
good enough.

Children are taught to be good (e.g. non-judgmental, friendly, kind,

successful, independent), but they are not saints-- they naturally have some badness in them
(e.g. making fun of others); or they are not able to be good yet (e.g. they are not able to sit
still in chairs, to pay attention all the time in class or to put their toys away). So they blame
themselves and believe they are not good enough.
In the Christian religion, Jesus said not to judge. But it’s natural for children to make
judgments. So children think maybe there’s something wrong with them. In China, every
child learns the story of a little boy who gives other children the bigger and better pears and
keeps for himself only the worst one. This little boy is praised for being generous and
selfless, and he is considered as the role model for other children. Everybody in China
thinks this is a great thing for a child, but I wonder. Maybe he feels he has to give up better
pears because he wants to be a good boy, but he does want them and he resents not having a
good pear for himself. This resentment, in turn, makes him feel ashamed. It is impossible
to feel ashamed and have compassion for oneself at the same time. Maybe he thinks he's not
worthy of a bigger pear.
The compassionate person shows compassion for suffering people.
reflect his unconscious wish to try to make himself have self-compassion.

This might
His efforts to

persuade others to have compassions for themselves may indicate his own unconscious wish
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to make himself have self-compassion.

It is common that people advise others to do things

that they believe they themselves should do.
4. Of course, there are other theories that can explain my phenomenon.

K. Neff in

the Self-Acceptance project maintains that humans try to have a sense of control or safety by
blaming themselves when terrible things that are out of human control happen.
Two Types of Compassion: I categorize various kinds of compassion that I have
discussed into two types: genuine compassion and reactive compassion.

Genuine

compassion refers to compassion expressed by people who, consciously and unconsciously,
have true positive regards toward those who suffer.
altruistic.

Genuine compassion is essentially

Examples can be compassion that is generated through projection or projective

identification.

In contrast, reactive compassion refers to the kinds of compassion that is

motivated by the compassionate people’s own needs.

Although this type of compassion is

sincere, it is generated to meet the compassionate person’s “selfish” needs.

Examples of

reactive compassion may be compassion that is generated by people who use reaction
formation, or people with low self-esteem and thus (unconsciously) use compassion as a way
to form connections with others.

The expressed compassion is a way of a person, who often

has low self-esteem, to meet his own needs for social connections.

As I have discussed

earlier, humans have the instinctual needs for social connections, which are vital for humans
to survive and thrive, both physically and psychologically.

In order to meet these needs,

one would have to form and maintain positive relationships with other people.

So when

seeing other people suffering, one may naturally show compassion to them, thereby giving
these people an impression that he is kind and understanding.
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Thus, his expressed

compassion can help him form connections with others, which essentially helping meet his
own needs for connections.

This can prove that people with low self-esteem, thereby

without self-compassion, can be very likely to have compassion for others, maybe more
likely than people with high self-esteem, because these fortunate people do not have to use
compassion to please others.

In addition, as I mentioned earlier, this thesis excludes

situations when people consciously use social skills to show compassion for others.
In reality, these different kinds of compassion can be shown in all sorts of
combination.
Critique of My Thesis
Although my focus in this thesis seems to target parents’ inappropriate or abusive
parenting behavior, it is quite possible that I overly blame parents.
little, these compassionate people’s parents were actually not harsh.
be caused by both the child and his parents.

Maybe when they were
The “damage” might

As Berzoff et al. (2011) put it

in the psychological realm, there are individual variations in what happens to what is
taken in emotionally. … Ten people being criticized or being given a hug will
similarly react in ten different ways depending on what psychological strengths,
vulnerabilities, past experiences, and social and cultural influences have made them
unique (p.121).
Besides, the child’s use of introjection may exaggerate parents’ frustrating behavior.
Berzoff et al. (2011) pointed out that, “With introjection, the power and influence of the real
external object [or world] diminishes because it is now controlled in fantasy within the self
(p.143).” Goldstein (2001) claimed that, “Because relationships with external real objects
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are experienced subjectively and maybe affected by fantasy, it is possible that a developing
child’s self- and object-representations do not actually reflect the objective situation (p.55).”
Thus, a frustrating interaction with a parent may make him look more scary than he is in
reality.

What’s more
Klein described the development of a harsh superego that forms very early and results
from the child’s introjection of powerful and destructive, angry and sometimes
guilt-provoking images of the parents, which are influenced by the projection of the
child’s own sadistic fantasies and impulses (Berzoff et al., 2011).

A person’s psyche is not only affected by his personal experiences with individuals in his life;
social and cultural factors can also profoundly influence a person’s internal world.
According to Berzoff et al. (2011), “Oppression, prejudice, hatred, discrimination, being
looked down on – all these messages get inside the internal world just as powerfully as
interactions with immediate family members (p.121).” I have to also consider that many
parents probably have done their best to take care of their children, given their own
limitations and circumstances.

I should not ignore the adaptive nature of their seemingly

“negative” parenting behavior.

As Berzoff et al. (2011) put it, “Primary responsibility for

raising children cannot be simply equated with primary responsibility for harming children
(p.155).”
Another limitation is that I possibly have missed important studies that might
challenge my ideas.
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Suggestions for Future Studies
Empirical studies (qualitative or quantitative) on this focal phenomenon would be
useful to evaluate the validity of my study.
Conclusions
Evolutionary, neurobiological theories and object relations theories seem to support
my hypothesis, which is that people without self-compassion can still have compassion for
others.

Meanwhile, neurobiological findings also shed light on why compassionate people

sometimes have no compassion for those who suffer.

Compassion arises conditionally.

People always go through certain appraisal processes before generating compassion for those
in pain.

I have talked about these compassion appraisal processes from both the

evolutionary perspective and the neurobiological perspective.
compassion are different.

So my research cannot determine definitively whether one can

truly love other people before he can love himself.
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